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NOTES
THE WARTIME SUSPENSION OF LIMITATIONS
ACT, THE WARTIME ENFORCEMENT OF
FRAUD ACT, AND THE WAR ON TERROR
Erin M. Brown*
INTRODUCTION
In 1945, while the world was sifting through the rubble of World
War II, Harold Lurie and Samuel Dworett were attempting to fraudu-
lently profit from the remnants of the American war machine. In
order to redistribute what was estimated at the time to be $75 billion
in surplus stock,' veterans were granted a priority right to buy prop-
erty, machinery, and other surplus items. 2 In fact, by the distribu-
tion's end, former soldiers purchased over $500 million worth of the
remaining tools and materials-twenty-two percent of the entire war
surplus.3
Lurie and Dworett, hoping to exploit this priority access to the
goods, attempted to fraudulently obtain veterans' preferences for
themselves and for their business, Rel Sales Company, Inc.4 They
"advised and caused" honorably discharged veterans to apply for
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; M.A., International
Relations, University of Chicago, 2006; B.S.F.S., International Politics, Georgetown
University, 2005. A special thank you to all of my generous friends, the dedicated staff
of the Notre Dame Law Review, and my endlessly supportive parents for taking the time
to read and improve this Note.
1 SeeJohn B. Olverson, Legal Aspects of Surplus War Property Disposal, 31 VA. L. REV.
550, 550 (1945) (citing S. REP. No. 78-539, pt. 2, at 3 (1944)). Olverson notes, for
example, that after World War II, the government was in possession of 500,000 to
600,000 machine tools, the equivalent of twenty-five years of prewar production. Id.
at 551.
2 See SruART D. BRANDES, WARHOGs: A HISTORY OF WAR PROFITS IN AMERICA 271
(1997).
3 Id.
4 United States v. Lurie, 222 F.2d 11, 13 (7th Cir. 1955).
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materials on the company's behalf, including counseling the veterans
to falsify statements on their applications.5 The two were eventually
indicted in 1952, but Lurie and Dworett filed motions to dismiss on
the grounds that the charges were barred by the three-year statute of
limitations on fraud.6
Despite the apparent staleness of the indictments, the govern-
ment was able to prevail on the prosecution by utilizing the Wartime
Suspension of Limitations Act7 (WSLA). The Act, seemingly drafted
for this very situation, suspended the commencement of the statute of
limitations on fraud until three years after the termination of hostili-
ties.8 Accepting the government's application of WSIA, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed Lurie and Dworett's
convictions.9
After a flurry of like prosecutions in the aftermath of World War
II, WSLA was not successfully invoked again for over fifty years.10 But
in May 2006, the government successfully relied on the now
"obscure"" WSLA to prosecute construction contractors who were
charged with multiple counts of fraud while the United States was
involved in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. 1 2 District Judge
Richard Stearns accepted the government's application of the Act,
allowing prosecutors to extend the statute of limitations and pursue
charges of fraud related to Boston's Central Artery/Tunnel Project,
known in Massachusetts as the "Big Dig."13
Awakening this essentially dormant Act not only has significant
implications for both corporate and individual actors, but it also
presents new challenges for judicial interpretation and reestablishes
an important tool for federal prosecutors. The application of this
twentieth century statute to a twenty-first century conflict, however,
5 Id.
6 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1952)).
7 Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 828 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3287 (West 2000 & Supp. 2009)).
8 Id.
9 Luie, 222 F.2d at 15, 16 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (1950)).
10 Judge Rules Wartime Law Applies to Big Dig, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Sept. 3, 2008,
http://www.upi.com/TopNews/2008/09/03/Judge-ruleswartime-law.applies-to-
BigDig/UPI-86221220463247 (citing Assistant U.S. Attorney Brian Kelly, who labeled
this the first successful modern application). For more on the Central Artery/Tunnel
Project, see generally Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, MTA-Project Background,
http://www.masspike.com/bigdig/background/index.html (last visited Oct. 27,
2009).
11 Judge Rules Wartime Law Applies to Big Dig, supra note 10.
12 United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 438-39 (D. Mass. 2008).
13 See id. at 455-56.
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also raises a host of concerns, including the constitutional tension that
arises when the judiciary must decide when the nation is at war, partic-
ularly in a threat environment where armed conflict is drastically dif-
ferent than the 1940s-conception of war. Judge Stearns's application
of this statute to non-war-related fraud also reopens an old jurispru-
dential inconsistency: exactly how broadly did Congress envision the
types of "fraud" that should be affected by WSLA? Further, it requires
a consideration of the purpose of the statute itself, and whether this
purpose can still provide interpretational guidance or a rationale for
the Act.
As it turns out, Senators Leahy and Grassley had already consid-
ered some of the problems inherent in WSLA and its application to
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 14 Nearly five months before
Judge Stearns issued his Big Dig decision, the Senators introduced the
Wartime Enforcement of Fraud Act15 (WEFA) in an attempt to mod-
ernize WSLA. Added as an amendment to the national defense bill,
the legislation made its way through both Houses, passing the Senate
in September 2008, and was signed into law on October 14, 2008.16
The Senators' amendment makes significant improvements to the
original WSLA, but unfortunately does not adequately address some
of its key shortcomings. Most notably, it does not apply to the breadth
of modern conflicts that are susceptible to wartime fraud, and its legis-
lative history complicates the already ambiguous jurisprudence as to
the scope of frauds that should be covered by the Act.17
Part I of this Note briefly introduces WSLA, looking at the pur-
poses behind the original Act and its application. This Part also ana-
lyzes four distinct problems with the sixty-year-old statute. First, it
addresses the practical question of why the Act was established in the
first place-either to counteract the increased opportunity for fraud
during wartime, or in response to the belief that the investigative
branches of government are less capable of initiating prosecutions
during times of war. Second, it assesses the theoretical problems with
14 See S. REP. No. 110-431, at 4 (2008) (explaining the inapplicability of WSLA to
the most recent military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan).
15 S. 2892, 110th Cong. (2008); see also S. REP. No. 110-431 (2008) (explaining
the background and purposes behind the amendment).
16 The bill was eventually passed as an amendment to the National Defense
Authorization Act. See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 855, 122 Stat. 4356, 4545-46 (2008) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3287 (West Supp. 2009)); see also Press Release, Office of
Senator Leahy, Leahy-Authored Provisions to Address Wartime Fraud Set to Become
Law (Sept. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Leahy Press Release], available at http://eahy.
senate.gov/press/200809/092708c.html (describing the amendment).
17 See infra Parts II & III.
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the Act, particularly the challenge of applying vague terms such as "at
war" to our current threat environment. Part I next considers consti-
tutional concerns, including the separation of powers and justiciability
problems inherent in the original Act. Last, this Part asks about the
appropriate scope of the Act, namely whether the statute is limited to
war-related fraud, or all fraud against the government during times of
war.
Part II explains WEFA and assesses how this amendment impacts
these four challenges. Part III considers ways to improve the under-
standing of WSLA and its new amendment, both through an analysis
of the courts' jurisprudence and legislative history, as well as by offer-
ing suggestions for further legislative clarification.
Overall, while this Note provides a fairly favorable assessment of
WEFA, it views the amendment as addressing only some of WSLA's
failings. In light of WEFA's shortcomings, legislators should look to
expand the kinds of conflicts that are covered by WSLA, and should
specifically define the types of fraud that merit a suspension of
limitations.
I. UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE ORIGINAL WSLA
The relevant text of the original WSLA states:
When the United States is at war the running of any statute of
limitations applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or
attempted fraud against the United States . . . shall be suspended
until three years after the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by
the President or by a concurrent resolution of Congress.18
The Act was originally signed into law in 1942 by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt,' 9 who vigorously spoke out against "war millionaires" and
18 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2006) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3287 (West
2000 & Supp. 2009)). A simple illustration helps explain how WSLA works in prac-
tice. When President Roosevelt proclaimed the end of hostilities in World War II on
December 31, 1946, this caused the statute of limitations to begin to run three years
later, on December 31, 1949. See, e.g., United States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235, 246
(1953). In the case of fraud committed during World War II, therefore, the three
year statute of limitations "began to run for the first time on January 1, 1950 and
expired December 31, 1952." Id.
19 The predecessor to WSLA was drafted in 1921 as a temporary measure during
World War I to extend the statue of limitations of fraud. See Act of Nov. 17, 1921, ch.
124, 42 Stat. 220, 220 (repealed 1927); United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436,
448 (D. Mass. 2008) (describing the purposes of the 1921 law); see also Bridges v.
United States, 346 U.S. 209, 218 n.17 (1953) (noting the reason for the repeal of the
1921 Act was the fact that the Department ofJustice "'did not propose to attempt any
further prosecution of offenses of that character, that is to say, offenses giving rise to
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profiteers who exploited the calamity of war.20 Throughout his presi-
dency, whenever Roosevelt requested further funding for military
spending, "it was usually accompanied by legislation for the 'preven-
tion of profiteering."'21 In 1948, WS[A was permanently enshrined in
Title 18 of the United States Code by President Harry S. Truman, 22
who as a senator had held public hearings to expose fraud and waste
by contractors during the war.2 3
Prosecutors attempted to apply WSIA to a wide range of fraudu-
lent acts in the immediate post-World War II years with mixed suc-
cess.24 These inconsistent outcomes can be attributed in some part to
interpretational challenges not unlike the ones facing the judiciary
today due to the vagueness of the statute's text and its ambiguous leg-
islative history.25
the statute"' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 70-16, at 1 (1927))). For an overview of wartime
profiteering during World War 1, see BRANDES, supra note 2, at 127-77.
20 See 2 LAWRENCE M. SALINGER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR AND CORPORATE
CRIME 870 (2005).
21 Id. (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
22 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 828 (current version at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3287 (West 2000 & Supp. 2009)).
23 See generally ANDREW J. DUNAR, THE TRUMAN SCANDALS AND THE POLITICS OF
MORALIrY 1 (1984) (reporting that the so-called "Truman committee" monitored
defense expenditures and saved taxpayers $15 billion).
24 One of the more celebrated cases in which WSLA was raised was the attempted
prosecution of Harry Bridges, a notorious Communist who saw the inside of the
Supreme Court on more than one occasion. See generally WiLLIAM M. WIECEK, The
Birth of the Modern Constitution 297-300 (2006) (discussing Bridges's immigration
concerns and his fraud charges that reached the Supreme Court). In Bridges v. United
States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), the Supreme Court narrowly decided that the statute of
limitations was not tolled by WSLA, and the opportunity for the government to indict
Bridges for fraudulently denying his affiliation with the Communist Party during his
naturalization proceedings had expired. Id. at 210-11; see also WIECEK, supra at 299
(discussing Bridges). A more successful application was the seventy-nine-count indict-
ment lodged against a subcontractor who falsified payroll records to fraudulently bill
the government for hours worked by nonexistent employees. See United States v.
Agnew, 6 F.R.D. 566, 566-67 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
25 See Willard P. Norberg, The Wartime Suspension ofLimitations Act, 3 STAN. L. REv.
440, 440-43 (1951). Norberg points out that careful draftsmen expressly provide stat-
utory definitions for their terms, and "[iun so far as haste, carelessness, or expediency
cause the lawmakers to forget or ignore the problem, the difficulties of interpretation
by the courts are enhanced.... [as] illustrated by the current difficulty experienced
by the federal courts in applying the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act." Id. at
440 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (Supp. III 1950)).
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A. Practical Criticisms: Purposes Behind the Act
While it is generally agreed that WLSA was not intended to secure
the prosecution of all frauds committed against the government dur-
ing times of war,26 the "legislative history offers no express affirmative
indication of the purpose that Congress had in mind."27
The simplest explanation is that there is a much greater opportu-
nity for defrauding the government when the nation is at war.28 The
legislative history of the Act details this concern, noting that "opportu-
nities will no doubt be presented for unscrupulous persons to defraud
the Government or some agency. These frauds may be difficult to
discover .. . and many of them may not come to light for some time to
come."29 This "demand-side" argument implies that the purpose
behind WSLA is a direct response to the greater possibilities for fraud
during wartime.30
An alternative, not entirely contradictory interpretation, suggests
that the purpose of the Act is to allow a hampered investigatory arm of
the government more time to prosecute fraud t According to Judge
Learned Hand, "the purpose of the [Act] was not to let crimes pass
unpunished which had been committed in the hurly-burly of war."32
In other words, the purpose of WSLA was less related to the opportu-
nity for fraud itself, and more tied to the fact that "investigative agen-
cies of the government are handicapped during such periods by loss
of personnel to the armed forces."33 This understanding of the Act
26 See id. at 442.
27 Id. at 451.
28 See Bridges, 346 U.S. at 218 ("Congress was concerned with the exceptional
opportunities to defraud the United States that were inherent in its gigantic and hast-
ily organized [war] procurement program.").
29 Id. at 219 n.18 (citing S. REP. No. 77-1544, at 2 (1942)); see also S. REP. No. 110-
431, at 2 (2008) (calling the original WS[A "vital in pursuing war profiteers, as prosecu-
tors used the law to pursue contracting fraud after the war was over" (emphasis
added)).
30 See United States v. Sack, 125 F. Supp. 633, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (noting that
the "volume of transactions in which the Government was engaged as a result of the
war made the three year period too short for effective law enforcement").
31 See, e.g., United States v. Bates, No. 89 CR 908, 2004 WL 2980649, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 20, 2004) (stating that the purpose of WS[A was "excusing the government,
not the government's opponent, from promptly prosecuting offenses during times of
war").
32 United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 368 (2d Cir. 1948).
33 Norberg, supra note 25, at 452 (suggesting that this line of reasoning implies
that the government should suspend limitations, therefore, on all crimes, and not
simply limit it to war-related fraud); see also Sack, 125 F. Supp. at 636 (stating the need
for the Act was "the fact that many law enforcement officials were preoccupied with
offenses in the more vital areas of espionage and sabotage, prevent[ing] them from
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presents a "supply-side" argument about the need for the statute-
while the need for prosecutions during wartime is high for reasons
discussed above, this need cannot be met with an adequate supply of
prosecutorial tools. 34
This reveals two possible rationales for the Act: executive and
congressional belief that businesses and individuals should not
improperly profit from the machinery of war, and Judge Hand's sug-
gestion that investigative capabilities are much less effective during
wartime. This bifurcated view of the purpose of WLSA is particularly
relevant when assessing the intended scope of both it and WEFA.3 5
B. Theoretical: Defining War in the Twenty-First Centuy
Under the original WSIA, there was no express definition of
what Congress meant by the phrase "at war."3 6 Surely, the 70th Con-
gress viewed the phrase "at war" through the lens of the only wars and
conflicts that it knew: World War I and World War II.37 The reality,
however, is that since the statute was enacted, the United States has
simply not declared war, "despite prolonged engagements in Korea,
Vietnam, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (twice) and shorter deploy-
ments in Panama, Grenada, Haiti, and Somalia, among others."3 8
The drafters' understandably myopic view of war hardly represents the
twenty-first century realities of armed conflict, which ranges from
peacekeeping missions, to democratic occupations, to threats of possi-
ble full-scale conflicts, and to the amorphous war on terror.
Although one could look at other contemporary or prior statutes
that use the phrase "at war" for interpretational guidance,3 9 this would
devoting their attention to offenses related to the commercial aspect of the war pro-
gram" (citing H.R. REP. No. 77-2051, at 2 (1942))).
34 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 110-431, at 2 (explaining that, despite the "hundreds of
investigations into contracts worth billions remain pending,... [u]nless the statute of
limitations is extended, these investigations may well be shut down before they can be
completed and wartime fraud will go unpunished").
35 See infra Parts I.D & II.D.
36 See Bates, 2004 WL 2980649, at *1 (rejecting defendant's attempt to apply
WSLA "for the time during which the government was fighting the 'war on drugs'").
37 But see United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 446 (D. Mass. 2008)
(suggesting Congress' choice of the term "at war" rather than "declared" war indicates
an intent to include less substantial conflicts).
38 Id. at 447. Three of those conflicts (Vietnam, Iraq II, and Afghanistan) were
congressionally sanctioned through authorizations for the use of military force; the
Korean conflict was sanctioned by the United Nations. Id.
39 See, e.g., Smith v. City ofJackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) ("[W] hen Congress
uses the same language in two statutes having similar purposes ... it is appropriate to
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not reveal a clear or consistent definition of the phrase.40 In fact,
courts have interpreted the term "at war" in other statutes to include
both formal and informal conflicts.41 Courts have also held that "Con-
gress in drafting laws may decide that the Nation may be 'at war' for
one purpose, and 'at peace' for another."4 2 Unfortunately, in drafting
WSLA, Congress did not decide at all.4 3
While there are myriad similar statutes and canons of construc-
tion which could theoretically aid in the interpretation of such a
vague statute,4 4 the ambiguous and amorphous threat environment
that exists today only makes interpreting "at war" even more
complicated.
For example, in 1993 prosecutors attempted to apply WS[A to a
case in the Western District of Texas, but the judge held that the
armed conflict in the first Gulf War was not "at war" within the mean-
ing of the statute. 4 5 The court reasoned that the Act only applies
when Congress formally declares war because the congressional intent
of the original Act "appears to have been more directly concerned
with such massive and pervasive conflicts as World War II.""6 The
court supported this reasoning with the fact that there were "no
reported decisions of civilian courts in which the Suspension Act was
presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both
statutes.").
40 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (2006) (establishing punishments for individuals
who interfere with the success of the military "when the United States is at war").
41 See, e.g., Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. 46, 48 (D. Conn. 1971), aff'd, 455 F.2d
992 (2d Cir. 1972) (interpreting "time of war" to include "an undeclared war as well
as a war which has been formally declared by Congress"); Morrison v. United States,
316 F. Supp. 78, 79 (M.D. Ga. 1970) ("[A] war is no less a war because it is
undeclared.").
42 Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 231 (1959).
43 See United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 442 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting
that aside from a formal declaration of war, Congress gave no indication of when
WSLA would be triggered).
44 To further complicate interpretation, courts also look to customary interna-
tional law to determine how the term "at war" should be applied. International law
also does not seem to require a formal declaration of war for two states or parties to
be "at war." See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 70 (Oct. 2, 1995) ("[A]rmed con-
flict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State.").
45 United States v. Shelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
46 Id. ("For the Persian Gulf conflict to have amounted to war under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3287, Congress should have formally recognized that conflict as a war.").
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applied during any of the 'wars' involving the United States that have
occurred since World War Il." 4 7
Contrary to this opinion, simply because prosecutors did not turn
to WSLA during the Vietnam or Korean wars does not imply that pros-
ecutors could not apply it during those wars. As Judge Stearns
explained in the Big Dig decision, "[t]he government should not be
penalized for invoking a criminal statute sparingly (or judiciously) ."48
Furthermore, the requirement of a massive conflict to trigger the Act
ignores the fact that the Vietnam and Korean wars were immensely
catastrophic, both financially and in human lives lost.4 9 The court's
dismissal of these conflicts applies an unnecessarily strict interpreta-
tion that discounts certain conflicts simply because they were not offi-
cial declarations of war or of sufficient subjective magnitude.
The court's holding also contradicts longstanding judicial prece-
dent, unrelated to WSLA, that does not require an official declaration
to establish that the United States is at war.50 The fact that "war may
exist without a declaration on either side"5 1 was conceded two hun-
dred years ago at a time when "at war" was much more clear cut than
it is today. A formal declaration of war is even more unnecessary and
unlikely in this era of asymmetrical threats and internationalism.
Moreover, had Congress intended to include only official declarations
of war in the original Act, it could have explicitly done so. 5 2
Each of these interpretative difficulties, particularly as the threat
environment becomes less defined by conventional warfare, exacer-
bates the weaknesses of WSLA-weaknesses that were only partially
addressed by WEFA.53
C. Constitutional: Separation of Powers and the Political Question
Because the Act does not specifically stipulate what it means to be
"at war," the Big Dig case highlights some of the constitutional ten-
sions present under the original WSLA.54 Most notably, it puts the
decision about when the nation is "at war" in the hands of the judici-
47 Id.
48 Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 445.
49 See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
50 See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 42 (1800) (declaring that fighting
with the enemy evidences that the nation is at war).
51 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863).
52 Cf 28 U.S.C. § 2416(d) (2006) (applying an act when "the United States is in a
state of war declared pursuant to article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United
States").
53 See infra Part III.B.
54 See United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 442-55 (D. Mass. 2008).
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ary, although war powers are specifically assigned to the executive and
legislative branches.5 5 In the Big Dig case, 'Judge Stearns actually had
to decide whether the U.S. [was] at war in order to decide whether
the statute of limitations had run."5 6
The case, United States v. Prosperi,5 7 involved the indictment of
concrete suppliers charged with submitting fraudulent reports to the
government.58 The defendants argued that the alleged charges took
place in early 2001 (the indictments were handed out in May 2006),
and the five-year statute of limitations barred the prosecution.5 9 By
tapping WSLA, however, the government was successful in suspending
the running of the statute of limitations until three years after the end
of hostilities as proclaimed by the President or Congress. 60 "There-
55 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2; see also 103 Op. Ind. Att'y
Gen. 407, 409 (1945) ("It has been held that the exclusive right to begin and termi-
nate War is in Congress."); id. ("'The existence of war and restoration of peace are
determined by action of the legislative, supplemented by the executive, department of
government.'" (quoting Kneeland-Bigelow Co. v. Mich. Cent. R.R. Co., 174 N.W. 605,
608 (Mich. 1919))).
56 Ashby Jones, U.S. Not Currently at War, Boston Federal judge Rules, WALL ST. J.
BLOGS, Sept. 2, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/09/02/us-not-currently-at-war-
boston-federal-judge-rules/trackback. Although traditionally war is terminated by a
peace treaty, Judge Stearns recognized that, like the disappearance of formal declara-
tions of war, such treaties are also less frequent: "The end of more recent conflicts
have been signaled by Presidential pronouncement or by the diplomatic or de jure
recognition of a former belligerent or a newly constituted government." Prosperi, 573
F. Supp. 2d at 454. Using this rationale, the district court judge decided that the
United States was at war with Afghanistan from September 18, 2001 (when Congress
authorized the use of military force against "those nations, organizations or persons"
responsible for the September 11 attacks) through December 22, 2001, when the
United States extended full diplomatic privileges to Afghan President Karzai's govern-
ment. Id. at 450-55. Interestingly, the judge stated specifically that "the statute of
limitations with respect to the Afghan conflict, expired on December 22, 2004." Id. at
455. This implies that the fraud should relate directly to the specific conflict, which is
hardly the case with the "Big Dig" contract.
Judge Stearns went on to decide that the United States was at war with Iraq from
October 11, 2002 (beginning with the authorization of military force in Iraq) until
May 1, 2003, when Bush declared that "[m]ajor combat operations in Iraq have
ended. In the Battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed." Id.
While his decisions about the termination of the conflicts seem logical, the judge
could just have easily decided that the country was still at war in both countries, partic-
ularly given that American presence in Iraq and Afghanistan had hardly diminished
since May 2003.
57 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 454 (D. Mass. 2008).
58 Id. at 439.
59 SeeJones, supra note 56.
60 See 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2006) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3287 (West 2000
& Supp. 2009)).
[VOL. 85:1322
WSLA, WEFA, AND THE WAR ON TERROR
fore, strange as it seems, Judge Steams had to decide whether the U.S.
[was] at war to rule on a motion involving contractors in a highway
project."6 1
This is an uncomfortable holding. Courts generally avoid ruling
on cases that touch on a "political question," which Baker v. Car6 2
broadly defined as
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discovera-
ble and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertak-
ing independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question.6 3
Without standards explicitly laid out in the statute, or at least
clear and consistent legislative guidance, courts are required to pass
judgment on the very political question of whether the nation is at war
with a foreign state. Foreign affairs are fundamentally political ques-
tions that courts often avoid, 64 yet the original WSLA essentially
required the judiciary to step actively into this off-limits arena.
61 Jones, supra note 56.
62 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
63 Id. at 217; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)
(noting early in the Court's history the existence of "[q]uestions, in their nature polit-
ical, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive," and
which, therefore, "can never be made in this court"). Each of these different "politi-
cal questions" laid out in Carr are implicit in deciding when the country is at war. A
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate politi-
cal department" is laid out in the first and second articles of the Constitution; the
vagueness of the statute, discussed supra Part I.B, highlights the lack of 'judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it"; declaring war is a political
question "of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion"; separation of powers mandates
that the courts avoid such determinations out of "respect due [to] coordinate
branches of government"; and foreign affairs, in particular, require the "unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made," particularly
because of the huge "potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question" in the international arena. Id.
64 See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("The conduct
of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the
Executive and Legislative-'the political'-Departments of the Government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision."). But see Carr, 369 U.S. at 211 ("Yet it is error to suppose
that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance.").
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Additionally, on separation of powers grounds, courts cannot and
should not interfere with the political branches of government.65 At
question here is which branch is intended to have final determination
of when the country is "at war." Both constitutionally and statutorily,
this duty falls to the legislative and executive branches.66 Carr, the
starting point for political question jurisprudence, specifically states
that there are "isolable reasons for the presence of political questions,
underlying this Court's refusal to review the political departments'
determination of when or whether a war has ended."67
This formalist interpretation highlights the constitutional ten-
sions in a statute that demands that the courts define the vague notion
of "at war." A functionalist, however, might make the counterargu-
ment that the statute does not require courts to determine when the
nation is at war, but rather whether the United States is "at war" within
the meaning of the statute (e.g., the end of hostilities as proclaimed
by Congress or the President). Even with this more pragmatic view of
the law, however, the original WSLA does not provide sufficient statu-
tory guidance for the courts, a problem that has been somewhat ame-
liorated by WEFA. 6 8
D. Scope: How Broadly to Define Fraud
Lastly, the statute is ambiguous as to whether the suspension
applies only to fraud specifically related to the war effort, or to any
fraud carried out against the government when the United States is at
war.
Professor Willard Norberg noted this difficulty as early as 1951,
just three years after the statute was permanently enshrined in the
United States Code. 69 Norberg called the problem with WSLA "one
of reference," because the phrase "involving fraud" is a "vague refer-
ent" causing courts to reach "divergent and at times confusing conclu-
sions as to which offenses against the United States 'involve fraud.' "70
Judicial history generally suggests that WSLA does not apply to all
fraud, but rather is limited to war-related frauds and frauds of a pecu-
niary nature or concerning property.7 1 Outlier cases, however, have
65 See Carr, 369 U.S. at 210 ("The nonjusticiability of a political question is prima-
rily a function of the separation of powers.").
66 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
67 Carr, 369 U.S. at 213.
68 See infta Part II.C.
69 Norberg, supra note 25, at 440-41.
70 Id.
71 See United States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235, 241 (1953); see also Dennis v.
United States, 384 U.S. 855, 863 (1966) (noting that the statute is "to be construed
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more narrowly interpreted the Act to apply only to the prosecution of
fraud specifically related to the war programs.7 2 Because the statute is
vague, the courts were forced to craft their own rules as to which types
of fraud fell under the purview of the Act. Courts have applied WSLA
to cases involving the submission of false financial statements on war
contracts73 and conspiracy to defraud the government in the purchase
of surplus war property.74 WLSA has not been successfully applied to
prosecutions for false statements made to obtain passports,75 false
statements under oath during naturalization proceedings,'7 6 the pass-
ing of worthless checks,7 7 and other instances of fraud completely
unrelated to the war effort.7 8
Assessing these holdings, a theory emerges that the fraud does in
fact have to be related to the war effort; however, the war effort has
been defined liberally. In other words, if the prosecution can tie the
fraud in any way to the war effort, then the court will usually allow the
application of the Act. If the fraud is directly related to a war contract,
then it obviously falls under the Act. In United States v. Sack,79 for
narrowly and to be applied 'only where the fraud is of a pecuniary nature or at least of
a nature concerning property'" (quoting Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 215
(1953))); Bridges, 346 U.S. at 216 (stating that the legislative history requires a con-
servative interpretation of WSIA).
72 See United States v. Sack, 125 F. Supp. 633, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ("The purpose
of the Suspension Act was to give the Government's law enforcement officials addi-
tional time to discover and punish offenses related to the commercial aspects of the
war program.").
73 Id. at 637.
74 See United States v. Lurie, 222 F.2d 11, 15 (7th Cir. 1955).
75 See United States v. Shoso Nii, 96 F. Supp. 971, 972-73 (D. Haw. 1951).
76 See Bridges, 346 U.S. at 227; United States v. Obermeier, 186 F.2d 243, 256-57
(2d Cir. 1950).
77 See McGuinness v. United States, 77 A.2d 22, 25 (D.C. 1950) ("[L]egislative
history of the legislation confirms our view that the Suspension Act was not intended
to embrace violations of the bad check law even if the checks were received by the
Government.").
78 See, e.g., United States v. Beard, 118 F. Supp. 297, 303 (D. Md. 1954) (refusing
to apply the Act to income tax evasion). The courts have also held that, in order to
qualify for WSLA, the fraud must be an essential element of the crime. See Bridges,
346 U.S. at 222 ("The purpose of the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act is not
that of generally suspending the three-year statute, e.g., in cases of perjury, larceny
and like crimes. It seeks to suspend the running of it only where fraud against the
Government is an essential ingredient of the crime."); United States v. Grainger, 346
U.S. 235, 242 (1953) ("[O]ffenses are limited to those which include fraud as an
essential ingredient."). This "essential ingredient" analysis is another way to distin-
guish between types of frauds that could be considered within the scope of WSLA, but
it is not addressed in this Note.
79 125 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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example, the government successfully relied on WSLA to pursue indi-
viduals who had falsified financial information in their applications
for war contracts. 80 In another vein, courts have also held that fraud
of a pecuniary nature or involving property brings the conduct under
the Act, because financial harm to the government during times of
military conflict would indirectly harm the war effort.8 '
This interpretation of fraud, insofar as it is tangentially related to
the war effort, is supported by Prosperi's holding.82 The Big Dig deci-
sion, the most recent interpretation of WSLA, applied the Act to a
construction contract entirely unrelated to the war effort-the fraud
involved the building and reconstruction of about eight miles of high-
way in Boston.83 The defendants were "accused of recycling stale and
adulterated concrete, and submitting false batch reports to conceal
their fraud"84-activities that have no actual relationship to the war
effort.
The defendants rejected the government's charges on two
grounds: first, because the United States was not "at war" within the
meaning of Act;85 and second, and relevant to this Part, because the
charges were not related to military procurement. The court in Pros-
peri relied on United States v. Grainger6 to reject the defendants'
claims, concluding that, despite a handful of lower court holdings to
the contrary, WS[A tolls the limitations period on non-war-related
fraud as long as the fraud creates a pecuniary harm to the govern-
ment.8 7 The Act, therefore, allowed for the prosecution of the Big
Dig contract fraud because the harm suffered by the government was
financial, and therefore tangentially affected the war effort.88
Understanding the scope of the Act is particularly relevant due to
the nature of WSLA. Because it is a statute of limitations law, courts
have a countervailing requirement to interpret the definition of fraud
narrowly so as to limit its application, and ensure that corporations
80 Id. at 636.
81 See United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 439 (D. Mass. 2008); Sack,
125 F. Supp. at 636.
82 See 573 F. Supp. 2d at 439-41.
83 See id. at 439.
84 Id.
85 For a discussion of the phrase "at war," see supra Part I.B and infra Part II.B.
86 346 U.S. 235, 241 (1953) (allowing for the application of the Act in charges to
defraud the Commodity Credit Corporation, of which the United States owns shares).
The Grainger court found this relevant to the war effort by noting the "pecuniary
nature" of the particular fraud. See id. at 240-41.
87 Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 441-42.
88 Id.
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and individuals can benefit from repose.89 "[A] s the section has to do
with statutory crimes it is to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose,
and ought not to be extended by construction to embrace so-called
frauds not so denominated by the statutes creating offenses."90 In
other words, courts should look to narrowly define exceptions to the
statute of limitations because such suspensions weaken the judicial
preference toward repose. This principle is meant to afford corpora-
tions and individuals general assurances that stale claims will not be
brought against them years after the alleged conduct.9 1
In defining the scope of fraud it is therefore important, as men-
tioned above, to understand the correct legislative intent of the Act.
Was it to ensure that frauds could be prosecuted years after the fact
due to the wartime obligations of the investigative branch? Or was it
to prevent fraud that specifically exploits war contracts? If the courts
allow the Act to apply to both war- and non-war-related frauds, it weak-
ens the normal judicial preference toward repose. As shown below,
WEFA does not help clarify the underlying purpose of the Act or the
scope of the word "fraud," leaving the courts with the continued
responsibility of interpreting the statute while also upholding the
important preference toward repose.
II. UNDERSTANDING WEFA AND THE NEW WSLA
A. Practical: Expanding the Potential to Prosecute Fraud
In drafting WEFA, Senators Leahy and Grassley achieved the
pragmatic goal92 of improving the prosecution of fraud by extending
the statute of limitations from three years to five years after the end of
hostilities.93
89 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970).
90 United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932) (citing United States v.
Hirsch, 100 U.S. 33 (1879)).
91 See also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321-23 (1971) (noting that in
addition to concerns about repose, statutes of limitation "'may also have the salutary
effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected
criminal activity'" (quoting Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115)); S. REP. No. 110-431, at 7 (2008)
(statement of Sens. Sessions & Coburn) (expressing concern about the implications
of tampering with the statute of limitations in WEFA).
92 WEFA also addresses the problems with vague terminology in twenty-first cen-
tury armed conflict. See supra Parts I.B & II.B. For the ways this amendment
addresses the justiciability and separation of powers concerns, see supra Part I.C and
infra Part II.C.
93 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub.
L. No. 110-417, § 855, 122 Stat. 4356, 4545-46 (2008) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. § 3287 (West Supp. 2009)); see also Leahy Press Release, supra note 16.
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"In times of war, we often do not learn about serious fraud until
years after the fact," Senator Leahy explained in a press release. 94
According to the Senator, the Bush administration "chose [ ] essen-
tially to ignore one of its primary obligations during wartime-to pro-
tect American taxpayers from losses due to fraud, waste, and abuse of
military contracts."95 Therefore, this amendment was pursued largely
as an effort to provide accountability to constituent groups, particu-
larly those frustrated with the perceived fraud and corruption in the
current military campaigns.96 The obvious concern was that, if the
statute was "left unchanged, under the current statute of limitations,
each passing day of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan could
amount to immunizing fraudulent conduct by war contractors that
has gone undiscovered during the Bush Administration or during the
conflicts."9
The amendment also helped bring WSLA up to date with mod-
ern statute of limitations rules. At the time WSLA was originally
enacted, the statute of limitations on criminal fraud was three years,98
yet the statute of limitations on fraud is currently set at five years.99
94 Press Release, Office of Senator Leahy, Leahy, Grassley Introduce Wartime
Fraud Legislation (Apr. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Leahy & Grassley Press Release], avail-
able at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200804/041808a.html.
95 Id. This view supports the demand-side view of the impetus for WEFA: that
there is a higher demand for fraud prosecutions simply due to the fact that the nation
is at war. Salam Adhoob, former chief investigator of the Iraqi Commission of Public
Integrity, estimated in his testimony to Congress that $9 billion has been lost to cor-
ruption and fraud in the latest campaign in Iraq. See Leahy Press Release, supra note
16. Leahy also cites "no-bid" and "cost-plus" contracts that have no oversight, as well
as cash contracts flown to Iraq and handed out in paper bags without any records.
Id.; see also Combating War Profiteering: Are We Doing Enough to Investigate and Prosecute
Contracting Fraud and Abuse in Iraq?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 2-3, 17-18 (2007) [hereinafter Combating War Profiteering] (statements of Sen.
Patrick J. Leahy and Special Inspector Gen. for Iraq Reconstruction Stuart W. Bowen)
(discussing no-bid and cash contracts and their relation to war profiteering). For
more information about corporate profiteering from the latest war effort, including
faulty bullet-proof vests, see, for example, William Baue, War Millionaires: Defense Con-
tractor CEO Pay Up 200 Percent Since 9/11, SOCIAL FUNDS, Sept. 1, 2005, http://www.
socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/1794.html.
96 See, e.g., Congress Votes to Crack Down on Fraud by Private Contractors in Iraq, Fox
NEWS.COM, Oct. 9, 2007, http://origin2.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,300631,00.html
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009) ("'Some of these contractors have declared the U.S. occu-
pation of Iraq open season on the American taxpayer.'" (quoting Representative Neil
Abercrombie)).
97 Leahy Press Release, supra note 16.
98 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1948), amended by Hiss Law Amendment, Pub. L. 87-299, § 1,
68 Stat. 1142 (1954).
99 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006).
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WEFA rids WSLA of this inconsistency by updating the statute of limi-
tations to its criminal counterpart, allowing more time for the investi-
gative branches to uncover and charge actors with fraud. 00
B. Theoretical: Stricter Guidance for Defining War
Under the original WSLA, determining when the United States
was technically at war was vague and abstract; the new amendment
helps to clarify this ambiguity, although its definition of "at war" still
leaves substantial gaps in the statute's application.' 0 As Senator
Leahy detailed in a press release, the original WSLA applied only
when the United States was "at war," yet the military operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan were undertaken without congressional declarations
of war.102 Throughout the last half century, in fact, the United States
has never been "at war" in the conventional sense of the term. Since
World War II, Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMF),
such as the AUMF preceding the second Iraq invasion, have been
used more frequently in place of conventional declarations of war. 03
WEFA suspends the statute of limitations not only for formal dec-
larations of war, but also for congressional AUMFs consistent with the
War Powers Resolution. 104 It does not, however, apply to interna-
tional peacekeeping missions under the United Nations or under any
military actions not specifically authorized by Congress. 0 5  "As a
result, only significant military actions requiring congressional action
trigger this suspension of the statute of limitations." 0 6
Is it a stretch, however, to imagine scenarios in the future in
which the United Nations Security Council will authorize the multilat-
100 See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,
Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 855, 122 Stat. 4356, 4545-46 (2008) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C.A. § 3287 (West Supp. 2009)); see also Leahy Press Release, supra note 16;
Leahy Press Release, Office of Senator Patrick Leahy, Judiciary Committee Reports
Leahy Bill To Address Wartime Fraud (June 26, 2008) [hereinafter Leahy &Judiciary
Comm. Press Release], available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200806/062608c.
html.
101 See infra Part III.B.
102 Leahy & Judiciary Comm. Press Release, supra note 100.
103 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3287 ("For purposes of applying such definitions in this sec-
tion, the term 'war' includes a specific authorization for the use of the Armed Forces
. . . ."); see also Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498, 1501-02 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1541 note (2006)).
104 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3287; Leahy Press Release, supra note 16. For more on the
War Powers Resolution, see 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1541-1548 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009).
105 See Leahy & Grassley Press Release, supra note 94.
106 Leahy & Judiciary Comm. Press Release, supra note 100.
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eral use of military force, to which the United States will surely be a
significant participant? These military activities will not be covered
under WEFA, yet could clearly be significant military actions suscepti-
ble to fraud. Furthermore, it is likely that the United States govern-
ment, acting outside of an official AUMF, will continue to carry out
large-scale military or peacekeeping operations. In an era less cen-
tered on large-scale state conflict and more focused on threats arising
from terrorists and other violent nonstate actors, this narrow view of
"at war" is incomplete and insufficient, and fails to bring WSLA com-
pletely up to date.
C. Constitutional: Removing Vagueness, Improving Separation of Powers
WEFA, while establishing a definition of "at war" that ignores sig-
nificant modern forms of conflict, does provide more rigid guidance
for the courts in deciding when the nation is at war. Such guidance
will help uphold traditional separation of powers requirements.
First, the amendment requires that the war must be officially
declared by Congress (either through an official declaration or an
AUMF). 1 0 7 Second, it mandates that the war, as defined, must be
ended by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation, with notice to
Congress.108 Both of these developments are important, as they
ensure that WSLA will no longer require a judge to determine when
the United States is at war (the Big Dig problem). In fact, a main
impetus for the amendment, as stated by the drafters of WEFA, was
"so courts, prosecutors, and litigants can be sure when the statute of
limitations starts to run."109
Of course, these clarifications hinge on the fact that only signifi-
cant, congressionally authorized declarations of war are sufficient to
trigger the statute. While WEFA may provide more judicial guidance,
if the bigger goal is allowing for the prosecution of frauds against the
government while the nation is at war, then Congress should have
detailed not only more rigid guidance, but also a broader, more mod-
ern, and more comprehensive definition of what constitutes "at
war."110
107 18 U.S.C.A. § 3287.
108 Id.
109 See Leahy & Judiciary Comm. Press Release, supra note 100.
110 See infta Part Ill.B for a discussion of the need for a broader definition of war.
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D. Scope: Ignoring an Age-Old Critique
Like under WSLA, the scope of fraud covered by WEFA is unclear
on its face. Therefore, understanding WEFA requires a clear concep-
tion of congressional intent.
A supply-side interpretation of the amendment implies that
WEFA applies to all fraud carried out against the government during
times of war because of strains on investigatory bodies. Courts have
generally refused to accept this broad, plain language interpretation
of the Act' 1 despite concerns that the government will not be able to
adequately provide prosecutorial services during wartime.' 1 2 A second
view is that the statute should apply to frauds that at least indirectly
affect the war effort, either in contract or as an economic burden.
This arbitrary rule reflects current jurisprudence as laid out in WSLA's
earliest applications, but does not necessarily represent the legislative
intent of the original drafters or the modern sponsors of WEFA." 5
Lastly, a demand-side framework would apply WEFA to fraud directly
related to the war effort, as the language surrounding the drafting of
the amendment seems to suggest."14
In the main, Senators Leahy and Grassley appear to be concerned
with specifically war-related fraud, such as faulty vests and contami-
nated water." 5 Under this demand-side framework, WEFA would no
longer apply to cases such as the Big Dig. The kinds of fraud cited by
the Senators-the cash contracts and corruption in Iraq-do not
seem to extend the amendment to non-war-related contracts." 6
The new amendment was essentially presented as a way to address
the numerous accounts of fraud in the Iraq and Afghanistan cam-
paigns, as evidenced by the abundant testimony and emphasis on
defective products, unsafe bullet proof vests, and faulty ammunition
111 See Norberg, supra note 25, at 441 ("Few courts have been enticed by the chi-
merical 'plain meaning' approach to the reference problem raised by the [WSLA].").
112 For more on the supply-side argument, see supra Part I.A.
113 See supra Part I.D.
114 This argument reflects the demand-side hypothesis that there is simply more
demand for prosecutions because there is more fraud due to the fact that the United
States is at war. See supra Part I.A.
115 See Leahy Press Release, supra note 16; Leahy & Grassley Press Release, supra
note 94; Leahy & Judiciary Comm. Press Release, supra note 100.
116 See Leahy Press Release, supra note 16; see also, e.g.,Jenny Mandel, Iraq Contrac-
tor Admits to Bribery and Fraud, Gov'T EXECUTIVE, Apr. 25, 2006, http://www.govexec.
com/dailyfed/0406/042506m1.htm (describing the case of a businessman who
admitted to bribing U.S. Department of Defense officials with more than $2 million in
cash and goods to steer over $8.6 million in contracts to his business).
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delivered to U.S. troops abroad.' 17 This language suggests that WEFA
was crafted to apply to demand-side frauds committed in Iraq and
Afghanistan, or at the very least, frauds related to the campaigns
there.'18
On the other hand, there is also language in the legislative his-
tory that suggests a concern about the ability of investigative agencies
during wartime. This concern implies an intent to place all frauds
committed against the government during wartime under WEFA.
According to Senator Grassley, the purpose of the amendment was to
expand the suspension period to "allow prosecutions of criminal
fraud after the war is ended so that investigations don't have to occur
while conducting military operations."" 9 This statement suggests a
broad, supply-side interpretation of fraud that would include prosecu-
tions of frauds completely unrelated to the war itself which might oth-
erwise be inhibited during times of war.
Because WEFA does not clearly state the scope of fraud to which
it applies, it is still up to the courts to decide which language in the
legislative history they will defer to, if at all. Because the current legis-
lative history is inconclusive, courts will likely rely on past WSLAjuris-
prudence, which straddled the two extreme interpretations of fraud to
include war-related fraud as well as frauds of a pecuniary nature or
involving property. 120
III. MOVING FORWARD: JUDICIAL AND LEGISiATIVE GUIDANCE
Despite the improvements made by WEFA to WSLA, two impor-
tant issues still need to be clarified by a definitive rule by the courts or,
preferably, through further legislative action. First, particularly in
light of WEFA's vague legislative history, the appropriate scope of
"fraud" should be made plain. Second, the definition of "at war,"
while improved, should account for an even more extensive vision of
modern military conflict, particularly in an era so focused on amor-
phous threats such as terrorism, rogue states, and violent nonstate
actors.
117 See Leahy Press Release, supra note 16; Leahy & Judicial Comm. Press Release,
supra note 100.
118 See Combating War Profiteering, supra note 95, at 2 (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(reporting "widespread fraud, waste, and abuse in Iraq on a scale that may be unprec-
edented in our history").
119 See Leahy & Grassley Press Release, supra note 94.
120 See supra Part I.D. Note also that this ignores the possibility that courts could
take a plain language view (i.e., a supply-side view) and allow for the prosecution of all
frauds that happen to be carried out during times of war.
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A. Redefining "Fraud"
Unfortunately, WEFA does not completely solve Professor Nor-
berg's complaint that WSLA is ambiguous as to the scope of fraud
covered by the Act.12 1 WEFA provided an opportunity for Congress to
lay out a clearer vision of fraud; now, as Norberg suggested fifty years
ago, "[i]n the absence of . .. ameliorative action by Congress, the
appellate courts should attempt to create some order out of the pre-
sent confusion." 122 The better solution, however, would be for Con-
gress to take further action to define fraud and clarify the extent to
which non-war-related fraud is affected by the statute.123 Barring that,
it is helpful here to assess the effect of WEFA, if any, on past WSLA
jurisdiction about the scope of fraud.
As discussed above, past judicial holdings reveal that WSLA
appears to cover two kinds of fraud: fraud directly related to war con-
tracts and fraud of a pecuniary nature.124 Legislative history sur-
rounding WEFA, however, provides confusing and contradictory
guidance. The majority of the language surrounding WEFA focuses
on fraud directly related to war contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
the general demand-side concerns about the potential for fraud dur-
ing the actual conflicts. 25 Other legislative rhetoric, however, seems
to impute to the amendment a narrow, supply-side vision of fraud by
implying that the goal of the amendment is to allow a preoccupied
and overwhelmed Department of Justice more time to prosecute all
frauds that take place during wartime. 26
The supply-side argument based on a handicapped investigative
branch, which has been generally short-shifted by the courts and in
WEFA's legislative history,127 is actually supported by past use of the
121 Norberg, supra note 25, at 452 ("Whether the legislature was thinking only of
criminal acts arising out of the confusion of war production and rearmament is
impossible to determine from the legislative history.").
122 Id.
123 See id. ("If Congress has a more limited purpose, it should express it in words
less susceptible to ambiguity, misinterpretation, and judicial expansion than those
found in the present Suspension of Limitations Act.").
124 See supra Part I.D.
125 See supra Part II.D.
126 See supra note 111-12 and accompanying text.
127 A few lower courts have ruled otherwise, holding that WSLA "is to be liberally
construed in favor of the public." United States v. Choy Kum, 91 F. Supp. 769, 771
(N.D. Cal. 1950). The issue in Choy Kum was whether the term "defraud" encom-
passed nonmonetary injuries to the United States, in this case violations of passport
laws. Id. at 770. There, the court decided that WSLA should be interpreted by look-
ing at the plain meaning of the words of the Act, and the general objective sought to
be attained by the Act. Id. at 771; see also United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93
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Act. Case analysis reveals that prosecutors did not use the statute to
go after only war-related and contracting frauds, but also crimes which
they could not prosecute during the war, possibly because of institu-
tional or investigative hamstrings. WSIA, for example, "played a sig-
nificant role in several of the postwar trials of alleged Communists."1 2 8
This use of the Act supports the interpretation that the statute should
allow for the prosecution of all frauds, not merely war-related frauds.
Furthermore, the original language of WSLA reinforces the idea
that the statute was enacted to deal with the supply-side, investigatory
constraints on the prosecutorial wing of the government during times
of war. The original statute did not serve to suspend the statute of
limitations for three years, but rather "' untilfune 30, 1945, or until such
earlier time as the Congress by concurrent resolution, or the President,
may designate."' 12 9 This timeline implies that the Act is not about the
war itself, but about allowing the Department of Justice the appropri-
ate amount of time to prosecute crimes missed during the "hurly-
burly" of war.130 In other words, the intention was that once this time
had passed, if it was less than three years, then Congress or the Presi-
dent had the power to restore repose and allow parties to move on.
Even under the permanently codified WSLA, which included a three-
year extension on the statute of limitations, courts viewed this provi-
sion as simply reflecting "Congress' intention . . . to give the Depart-
ment of Justice six years from the [cessation of hostilities] to
investigate and prosecute."131
Prior to WEFA, the courts generally rejected the broad, supply-
side interpretation. 132 As Norberg noted, "[p]erhaps Congress should
have been motivated [by fear of general fraud], but the unsuccessful
attempt of Representative Rankin of Montana to secure the passage of
just such a general suspension act leads one to believe that Congress
had a more limited purpose in mind."133 For the most part, prior
jurisprudence has not recognized a plain language interpretation of
(1941) (noting that WS[A should not be narrowly construed to require a showing
that alleged charge involved monetary injuries to the government); Choy Kum, 91 F.
Supp. at 711 ("To the end that while fighting for its life the sovereign would not have
to divert a portion of its energies to attend timely to criminal acts of a domestic nature
which were injurious to it as a sovereign, the Congress wisely provided for a suspen-
sion of the operation of the general Statute of Limitations.").
128 See Norberg, supra note 25, at 440.
129 United States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235, 245 (1953) (quoting Act of Aug. 24,
1942, ch. 444, Pub. L. No. 77-706, 56 Stat. 747 (1942)).
130 See United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 368 (2d Cir. 1948).
131 United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225, 231 (1952).
132 See Norberg, supra note 25, at 442.
133 Id. at 451-52.
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the statute, and its proponents were able to creatively explain the
prosecutions of Communists as tangentially war related using the
pecuniary fraud argument. 1 3 4
WEFA's legislative history further complicates this already confus-
ing jurisprudence. 3 5 Because the language surrounding the amend-
ment is inconclusive-it suggests both a limited and expansive view of
the scope of fraud-it is probably insufficient guidance to overrule
over sixty years of WSLA jurisprudence. The courts will likely con-
tinue to uphold their judicially crafted limits on fraud-pecuniary
and war related. If Congress would like the statute to apply more
broadly, or more narrowly, it should legislate so explicitly.
B. Redefining War
WEFA's definition of war, while beneficial on separation of pow-
ers and other justiciability grounds, does not sufficiently address the
kinds of conflict that should be covered by a modern suspension of
limitations act. Like understanding the scope of fraud, appropriately
defining the scope of "at war" should be considered in light of the
purpose of the Act. Here, however, both the supply- and demand-side
incentives for the Act support the extension of "at war" to include
conflicts outside of conventional warfare.
First, if the Act is concerned about the supply-side issue-that the
Justice Department is spread too thinly during times of war-then it
should clearly extend to the efforts to fight terrorism and nonstate
actors. In fact, the so-called "war on terror" precipitated the largest
restructuring of the Department of Justice and the FBI in fifty years,
including the creation of a new National Security Division13 6 and the
diversion of huge numbers of personnel and funds from other investi-
gatory bodies to focus on the investigations and prosecutions of
crimes related to terrorism.' 3 7 If the concern is about the inability for
the Department of Justice to prosecute fraud because it is hampered
134 For a discussion of pecuniary fraud, see supra Part I.D.
135 See Norberg, supra note 25, at 442 ("No court has as yet supplied a workable
rule by which the line of demarcation can be recognized.").
136 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SECURIY DIVISION PROGRESS
REPORT 2 (2008) (describing the developments in the U.S. security program since
September 11, 2001). Also, it is noteworthy that there is a statute extending the stat-
ute of limitations for certain terrorism offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3286 (2006).
137 See generally U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Justice Department Counter-Ter-
rorism Efforts Since 9/11 (Sept. 11, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/Sep-
tember/08-nsd-807.html ("Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the highest
priority of the Justice Department has been to protect America against acts of
terrorism.").
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during wartime, then the war on terror presents a prime example of
investigatory hamstrings that might merit a suspension of the statute
of limitations.
On the other hand, if one considers the demand-side argu-
ment-that there is more opportunity for fraud during times of war-
then, as with conventional warfare, the war on terror, conflicts against
nonstate actors, peacekeeping missions, and other non-congressional
military initiatives all leave the nation exceedingly vulnerable to fraud.
While the limitations that WEFA placed on "at war" are better than
under the original WSLA, 13 8 it does not adequately set forth all of the
kinds of modern conflicts that currently leave the government vulner-
able to huge amounts of fraud. The Korean War, in which over
33,000 American soldiers died and over $335 billion dollars were
spent, would not have constituted "at war" under the new amend-
ment.13 9 Similarly, President George H.W. Bush sent thousands of
soldiers into the Middle East in the months preceding the first Gulf
War, without a congressional authorization for the use of force; any
fraud surrounding this initial deployment would not have satisfied
WEFA's requirements. 140 In the international context, Congress
recently pledged $1.69 billion for international peacekeeping, hardly
an insignificant fund, and undeniably vulnerable to fraud. 41 Again,
this is not covered under WEFA.
It is important to expand the Act's definition of "at war," espe-
cially in this era, and it will be easier to do so if Congress also limits
the scope of fraud that qualifies under the Act. 1 4 2 Because we are
faced with more amorphous conflicts, the kinds of fraud that are ame-
138 See supra Part II.B.
139 See CARL KAYSEN ET AL., AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & Scis., WAR WITH IRAQ 54-55
(2002), available at http://amacad.org/publications/monographs/War-withIraq.
pdf. The cost was adjusted to 2002 dollars. The war was authorized under S.C. Res.
83, U.N. Doc. S/RES/83 (June 27, 1950).
140 See Nora Boustany, U.S. Sends Troops, jets to Saudi Arabia As Iraqi Forces Pose
'Imminent Threat,' WASH. PosT, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al. President Bush relied on his
inherent Commander in Chief powers to send in troops without congressional
approval, but later went and asked for congressional authorization, which he received
from both Houses. See also Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Reso-
lution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, § 2, 105 Stat. 3 (1991) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note
(2006)); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
141 See Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr., U.N. Peacekeeping Vital to International Security, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, Apr. 3, 2008, http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/
April/20080403123540dmslahrellekO.4752313.html ("The Bush 'administration con-
siders United Nations peacekeeping to be in the direct national security interest of
the United States. It deserves and it receives both our political and financial sup-
port.'" (quoting Assistant Sec'y of State for Int'l Org. Affairs Kristen Silverberg)).
142 See supra Part III.A.
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nable to exemptions should be clearly delineated-either using a war-
related model, the pecuniary-harm precedent, or another rubric cho-
sen by Congress. Limiting fraud, while important for the reasons
mentioned above, is even more important when "at war" is expanded
to include conflicts without definite beginnings and ends. 1 4 3
Extending this statute to amorphous conflicts like the war on ter-
ror does open the possibility for fraud with no statute of limitations,
which flies in the face of the judicial preference toward repose. Con-
gress should certainly take this into consideration if it attempts to re-
envision the definition of "at war" under the statute.
One possible solution might be to expand the scope of "at war,"
but determine the statute of limitations from the date of the alleged
conduct, not the end of hostilities (which is vague and sometimes
nonexistent). For example, for fraud against the government directly
related to military contracts in the war on terror, the statute of limita-
tions could be extended to ten years from the date of the fraudulent
activity (similar to the five-year WEFA suspension and the five-year cur-
rent statute of limitations). Therefore, if Lurie and Dworett144 were
fraudulently attempting to purchase surplus materials of a peacekeep-
ing mission, instead of an officially declared conflict like World War
II, the government would have double the length of time to uncover
their deeds and secure their prosecution.
A framework that defines the statute of limitations from the date
of the conduct, rather than the date of the termination of hostilities,
could allow for a more comprehensive understanding of "at war,"
while also ensuring that the statute of limitations on fraud has a rea-
sonable lifespan. In a supply-side framework, where the incentive for
143 WEFA declares that the termination of war is complete upon "a Presidential
proclamation, with notice to Congress, or by a concurrent resolution of Congress";
however, this definition hardly seems complete when military conflicts, particularly
those that are vulnerable to fraud, are not going to be the large-scale sorts that
require full congressional or presidential conclusions. See Duncan Hunter National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 855, 122 Stat.
4356, 4545-46 (2008) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3287 (West Supp.
2009)). Narrowly defining war in this era would strengthen the judicial preference
for repose, which is at risk if "war" is characterized in a more endless, amorphous
manner. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2270 (2008) (noting that the
"duration of hostilities ... may last a generation or more"); S. REP. No. 110431, at 7
(2008) (statement of Sens. Sessions & Coburn) (expressing concern that there will be
situations, such as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which if "a President is
hesitant to officially announce the end of hostilities, the statute of limitations will
never start running," which means that "contractors could remain subject to potential
liability for criminal offenses (or investigations) for years, possibly a lifetime").
144 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
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the Act is the investigatory impediments caused by the war itself, then
perhaps this model is not as applicable. But if Congress is concerned
about a demand-side framework, as Senators Leahy and Grassley
imply by consistently remarking on the opportunities for fraud in and
related to the current military campaigns, 145 then the legislature should
be just as concerned about the possibility for fraud in peacekeeping
operations, U.N. sanctioned missions, and counterterrorism efforts.
Such military campaigns would not fall under WEFA, but could be
reasonably covered by an amended regime that commences an
extended statute of limitations on war-related frauds from the date of
the fraudulent conduct.
CONCLUSION
The senators' efforts in drafting and passing WEFA are flawed,
but not without merit. The new amendment expands the suspension
of the statute of limitations to five years, bringing it up to its criminal
counterpart; it includes AUMFs so as to cover conflicts such as the
current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan; and it concretely defines
"at war" so as to eliminate some of the constitutional concerns noted
above.
In so defining war, however, the amendment fails to encompass
the complete breadth of conflicts that are vulnerable to wartime
fraud. As it is currently crafted, United Nations initiatives, peacekeep-
ing missions, and counterterrorism campaigns are outside of the pur-
view of the Act. Yet these military initiatives obviously carry significant
opportunity for fraud against the government.146 In future modifica-
tions of WSLA, Congress should include these twenty-first century mil-
itary initiatives, perhaps by significantly expanding the window for
prosecuting frauds related to these "timeless" conflicts from the date
of the fraudulent conduct. This would preclude the need to define
the indefinable-namely, when these kinds of wars end-while at the
same time extending the timeline for prosecution, and ensuring the
important benefit of repose.
In addition to WEFA's narrow definition of war, language found
in WEFA's legislative history provides contradictory guidance as to the
145 See Leahy Press Release, supra note 16; Leahy & Grassley Press Release, supra
note 94; Leahy Judiciary Comm. Press Release, supra note 100.
146 It is also worthwhile to consider the extent to which contracting and subcon-
tracting are involved in modem day conflicts and warfare, which only exacerbates the
potential for fraud related directly to war and military contracts. See S. REP. No. 110-
431, at 3 (2008) ("Private contractors have been used to a greater extent during these
war-time activities than at any time in our history.").
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purpose of the amendment itself. This ambiguity complicates the
already confusing jurisprudence as to the kinds of fraud that should
be covered by WSLA's suspension of the statute of limitations. Con-
gress should continue to improve on the work of Senators Leahy and
Grassley by expressly defining the types of fraud that merit a suspen-
sion of the statute of limitations so this important question is no
longer left to the courts. A concrete, limited definition of fraud, com-
bined with an expansive vision of "at war," would provide guidance for
courts, repose for corporate and individual actors, and an improved
prosecutorial tool for the Department of Justice.
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